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ABSTRACT
Subjects performing visual target tracking tasks have been shown to utilize
perceptual organization. This organization has been shown to have both Gestalt
features and goal-oriented features. Previous studies have attempted to use
memory recall techniques to examine potential cognitive groupings in air traffic
control tasks, with negative results.
Analysis of eye movements has shown similar patterns of organization to the
underlying visual tasks. Experiments were performed to evaluate whether recall
or eye-tracking techniques can be used to extract perceptual groupings. Subjects'
memory of scenario information is generally poor, except where significant
manipulation of targets occurred. For this reason it is suggested that recall
techniques may not be able to elicit subjects' cognitive groupings. Fixation data,
however, indicates clustering consistent with Gestalt factors. Goal-oriented
factors did not seem to affect grouping.
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Chapter 1
PERCEPTUAL CONCEPTS IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
1.1 Introduction
Studying the concepts of cognitive psychology is essential to understanding not
only why the air traffic control (ATC) system succeeds despite a very high degree
of task difficulty and virtually no automation, but also how to safeguard that
performance in the face of increasing automation and free flight concepts. There
is still considerable debate about the nature of perception, attention, memory and
comprehension. Models have been developed and tested which although not
definitive, provide enough predictive capability to examine where cognitive limits
are being pushed in a task such as air traffic control. This section will introduce
these concepts, and show how they apply to ATC.
The experiments that form the basis of this thesis dealt only with the visual
aspects of a target-tracking task like air traffic control. For this reason, the
following discussion will focus on that aspect of perception. ATC is, however,
both a visual and an aural task. Voice communications form at least as big a part
of the task of the controller as the visual aspects. Not only do more errors
originate from voice communication difficulties, but also the controller's
situational awareness would be compromised without the information received in
this manner.
The aural aspects of ATC are better understood than the visual aspects,
however. Furthermore, many of the proposed changes to ATC will impact the
displays the controllers use. There have been no conclusive studies on how
controllers are able to perform their job, nor on what circumstances lead to
errors. This deficit needs to be remedied in order for designers to be able to
predict the impact of proposed changes.
1.2 Perception
The physical aspects of visual and aural sensation are known. Once the stimuli
leave the sensory organ involved, however, there is little understanding. This is
the area of concern, "the way in which we interpret the information gathered
(and processed) by the senses. In a word, we sense the presence of a stimulus,
but we perceive what it is" (Levine and Sheffner, p.1).
This is not to say there are not sensory detection problems in ATC. Digits on
the radar scope are unclear, the display is generally cluttered, and communications
are garbled. These problems are mostly understood, however, and often easier to
tackle than perception problems, given proper resources.
1.2.1 Visual perception
The message that reaches the visual cortex is a processed and summarized
record of the original stimulus. The most important information (edges,
contours, changes) is transmitted, while the steady-state information is omitted.
This information is taken in during discrete fixations, interrupted by sweeps of
the eye called saccades. The movement is fast (about 30-100 msec), although it
takes about 200 msec for a fixation. Normal visual processes are mostly
suppressed during saccades, as information received during an eye sweep would
be blurry. Given these times, people are capable of about three or four visual
cycles per second, although far less time is required to actually perceive visual
scenes.
This feature can be demonstrated by examining our perception of lightning.
Bolts of lighting generally consist of three or four component bolts of about one
msec each, with a separation of about 50 msec, for a total of about 200 msec.
How is it that we can examine a scene illuminated by lightning, and why does the
illumination appear to fade instead of dissipating instantly? This is due to "visual
persistence", the apparent persistence of the stimulation beyond its actual
duration. Visual stimuli must be held in a memory register briefly. This register
is referred to as "visual sensory memory."
Sperling (1963) tested the capacity and duration of this storage. Subjects were
presented arrays of letters and digits for very brief durations (5 to 500 msec), then
asked to report what they remembered from the display. Sperling found that
four or five items were reported correctly.
Sperling then showed that more items were available but faded from visual
sensory memory before they could be retrieved. Given three rows of four items
each presented again very briefly, subjects could retrieve three out of four items
on a row when prompted for a particular row after the display went off. Other
tests showed that this "iconic" memory is erased by subsequent visual
stimulation, such as a new icon or a very bright screen. This erasure was dubbed
"interference," a term to which we will refer several times in this paper.
Once the image is observed and placed in visual sensory memory, it must be
comprehended. The characteristics of comprehension are somewhat unclear.
Reading is typically used as an example. "Template" matching (where one
matches a template of what a particular letter looks like) and feature matching
(where one matches the major features of a letter) arguments do not capture all
aspects of recognition. Consider that when one reads sentence, one often fails to
detect misspelled words (or even missing words, as is the case in the preceding
clause - a missing "a" before "sentence"). Context and expectation significantly
influence perception. This interpretation process is automatic, and is nearly
indistinguishable from actual sensation.
1.2.2 Visual perception in air traffic control
As mentioned above, people are able to perceive large amounts of information
in a very brief period of time. The data on the scope or the flight progress strip
do not have to be present, or fixated upon, for very long for the information to
be perceived. However, the presence of continuous interference in the form of
new stimuli can prevent all this information from being interpreted and
committed to long-term memory.
This is particularly important to our application. A radar display contains
symbolic information (the aircraft target), spatial information (sector features,
direction of flight, motion of the targets) and text information (identification,
speed, altitude, etc.). Given brief glances at the target information, our
understanding of memory suggests that controllers could not transfer
information about aircraft to long-term memory. If consecutive fixations are
very brief (<200 msec), it is unlikely that the controller can even identify what has
been seen, since the iconic memory is being erased by interference from the
succeeding fixation.
Controllers scan the scope, adding features of relevant information to their
"picture" (also known as their mental model) of the traffic. The controller will
use deep knowledge of the sector, aircraft characteristics and typical intentions to
very quickly understand the situation. The scope appears hopelessly complicated
to untrained eyes, but controllers are able to discern features of importance with a
short viewing. The perception of this information is almost completely automatic
for the controller.
Subjects performing target tracking scan the scope, briefly fixating upon targets
and/or target information. The information must be passed into short-term
memory in order to be interpreted. I shall come back to what happens in short-
term memory in a succeeding section.
A large number of ATC errors are associated with misperceiving data. Some
of this is due to attention, which will be discussed below, but many errors are due
to applying context inappropriately. Controllers may interpret information
incorrectly because of expectations, either failing to perceive the correct data, or
inserting data that is not present. An example of this might be a slowed reaction
time to detection of an overshooting final, or not initially noticing that an aircraft
has continued ascent beyond its assigned altitude.
1.3 Attention
An item missing from the analysis above is attention. It is apparent that a great
deal of information reaches the brain only to be discarded if not considered
pertinent. This discrimination process is attention. An important result of the
research in placing the attention process is that most of the limitations of
processing associated with attention occur after the information is accrued in
memory.
Early theories of attention (Welford, 1960; Broadbent, 1958) located the
process between perception and memory. Later evidence placed attention after
the accrual of information in memory, and these seem to hold up better under
experimental scrutiny. Numerous experiments demonstrated a widespread and
parallel access to memory systems by stimuli, with attention being the control of
this information in memory (Keele and Neill, p. 41).
There are several results worth noting. In the first, Morton (1969) had people
sort cards on the basis of the numerals 1 to 6, or numerosity of X marks ranging
from one X to six Xs, or "redundant" numerals and numerosity (one 1, two 2s,
etc). Subjects sorted faster in the redundant task than in either component alone.
This finding was confirmed and expanded upon by Ellis and Chase (1971).
Redundant information is perceived in parallel, and begins to accrue in memory.
This accrual occurs faster given redundant information, resulting in reduced
error, reaction time, or both.
The second experiment of note concerns irrelevant information. Numerous
studies (Morgan and Alluisi, 1967; Well, 1971; Keele, 1972; and Egeth et al.,
1972) demonstrated that some irrelevant information is processed to the
memorial stage, but is discarded. Several studies (Garner, 1974; Kahneman,
1973; Lockhead, 1972) have shown that of the irrelevant information that is
remembered, only irrelevant information that is integral to the stimulus affects
accuracy, reaction time and recall. For instance, if the X-counting experiment
above used complex faces instead of X's, reaction time would be slower than if
normal X marks were used but a face were imprinted on the background of the
task. The shape of the marks, although not important to the task, is integral to
the stimulus, while a separate background image is not. Integral information,
even if irrelevant, is passed along to memory, while nonintegral information is
not. This suggests that if the data tag contains information about an aircraft that
is not needed to perform the task, its mere presence will affect performance,
whereas the presence of other information on the scope display (such as navaids
not involved with the aircraft) will not.
Another result of interest is that of activation (Posner and Snyder, 1975;
Neely, 1977). Neely had subjects decide if two words, one shown after the other,
were the same or different. The words were preceded by a priming word. Neely
told his subjects that if bird appeared, to expect a word like "robin" or "sparrow"
to appear next. If the word building appeared, the subject should expect a body
part, like "arm" or "leg." The results showed that only when the prime was bird
was there a benefit to priming.
This last result demonstrated that when a stimulus is received, information in
memory associated with that stimulus is activated automatically. Stimuli received
after this activation and associated with the activated memory benefit from better
reaction time and accuracy. The converse is also true. Reaction time will suffer
should a stimulus not associated with the activated memory be received (i.e. an
unexpected signal).
The concept of automaticity is directly related to attention as well. Automatic
processes, such as reading familiar words, hearing one's name, etc. consume no
conscious resources. Those resources can be used to perform other tasks.
Numerous automatic processes can be carried on at one time; walking while
whistling is an example.
Conscious processes, on the other hand, require attention. They are either too
unfamiliar or too complex to be automatic, and generally consume most of the
available resources in the cognitive system. Multiple conscious processes can
only occur simultaneously if they are very simple, although one can perform a
number of automatic processes along with a conscious one (listening to the news
on the radio while operating the directional signals, perhaps chewing gum and
keeping your car on the road).
If all processes were automatic, there would be substantially less cognitive
limitation to human processing. There are ways to make conscious processes
automatic, however. This is obvious, since walking was once a conscious process
for us all as children, yet now it is automatic. Practice is what transforms
conscious processes into automatic ones. Humans can be taught extremely
complex activities with practice (e.g. air traffic control). Many of the activities of
the controller are highly automated, one reason why controllers are fiercely
protective of their procedures and displays.
1.4 Memory
1.4.1 Short-term memory
Miller (1956) is one of many researchers who showed that the span of
immediate memory for a single stmulus dimension is about 7 items in length.
For multiple stimulus dimensions the number is much larger. We can perceive
large quantities of sensations, and we can hold vast amounts of information in
our long-term memory, but immediate memory is the bottleneck in this
information processing system.
Items can be grouped or "chunked" to stretch the limitation. In fact, given
practice and a clever encoding scheme, people have been able to recall large
numbers in order - 82 digits in work done by Chase and Ericsson (1982). This
type of encoding is done with reference to very familiar (automatic) knowledge
accrued in long-term memory. This concept is central to the experiments that are
the subject of this thesis, and will be discussed in greater detail in a succeeding
section.
Given enough time, almost anyone could memorize an 82-digit number.
Often there is insufficient time or attention to apply a scheme to transfer the item
to long-term memory. The natural assumption was that time, in the form of
memory decay, was the significant factor. Waugh and Norman (1965), however,
showed that interference was the primary factor, although the decay theory is
difficult to test. Forgetting is strongly influenced by intervening items prior to
transference to long-term memory.
Interestingly, Keppel and Underwood (1962) and Wickens (1972) also showed
that previous trials in a remembering task influenced recall in current trials, a kind
of proactive interference. New learning was disrupted by old knowledge.
Another example of this is being taught that in Italian bathrooms "C" means
"caldo" which means "hot", but forgetting and turning the wrong tap. If it were
a completely different letter it is unlikely one would make the same mistake with
the same frequency.
Recall that attentive processes occur after the accrual of information in
memory. The ability to process this information is then affected by redundancy,
interference, activation, and automaticity. Understanding the expertise of the
controller depends on our understanding of these concepts. For example,
checking in on a new frequency and having the aircraft "ident" their data tag on
the scope is likely to have other benefits than just confirming identification and
functionality. There are redundancy effects as well. The continuous interference
of the numerous call signs, all of similar form, and of other information (altitude,
speed, heading) may explain why it is difficult for controllers to recall that
information (as seen in Endsley & Rodgers, 1996). Alternatively, it may explain
why the form of the task has been developed to ensure that recall of this
information is not necessary to its successful completion. Activation and the
automaticity of many of the highly practiced tasks explain the speed with which
controllers perform.
This does not clarify the purpose of short-term memory, however. To
understand this, we need a broader model of short-term memory. Such a
concept was refined by Baddeley and Hitch (1974).
1.4.2 Working memory
The work by Baddeley and Hitch refined a concept that has been studied since
about 1905, although the term "working memory" was not introduced until the
late 1960s. Baddeley and Hitch attributed to working memory three systems: a
"ccentral executive", a "phonemic loop", and a "visuospatial scratch pad."
The evidence for the phonemic loop (or "articulatory rehearsal loop" or
"phonological loop") was discovered when they observed that a concurrent
memory load of three items did not impair free recall, comprehension, or
reasoning tasks in subjects. The suggestion was that this process could be
shunted to a separate process, a rehearsal loop that could store limited amounts
of speech-like information. Note that the information does not have to be
auditory, just speech-like. Other studies showed that visually presented verbal
material could not be rehearsed (and hence not remembered) if the subject
repeated out loud a word such as "the the the" or "hiya hiya hiya." It was also
argued that the capacity was limited by how much a subject could verbalize in 2
seconds, seemingly the rate of decay of information from this system (Baddeley,
Thomson, and Buchanan, 1975).
Salame and Baddeley (1982) proposed a further segmenting of this feature
into a phonological store and a subvocal rehearsal loop. This explained the two-
second verbalization limitation. Auditory stimuli would receive privileged access
to the store, while visually presented verbal stimuli would be accessed through
the rehearsal loop. Subsequent research by Baddeley (Baddeley et al., 1984;
Baddeley, 1986; Vallar & Baddeley, 1984) supported these results. The two-
second limitation was a limitation of the phonological store, but could be
refreshed from the articulatory loop, if available. This loop, however, is
unavailable when suppressed by articulation. So while we can hear and see while
we are talking, we cannot rehearse the verbal information and therefore cannot
retain it for long.
The visuospatial system within working memory has been shown to have a
similar structure. Experiments done by numerous researchers (Baddeley, Grant,
Wight, & Thomson, 1975; Baddeley and Lieberman, 1980; Morris, 1987; Quinn
& Ralston, 1986; Smyth, Pearson, & Pendelton, 1988; Beech, 1984; Logie, 1986;
Quinn, 1988) confirmed the idea put forward by Baddeley and Hitch (1974).
Overall, this body of work appears to demonstrate that the visuospatial system in
working memory consists of a short-term store that is linked directly to the
processes of visual perception, but that can be refreshed by spatial rehearsal.
Irrelevant physical movements, such as waving arms or walking in place can
suppress this rehearsal.
The central executive is the last component of this model of working memory.
This component has been shown to have no storage capacity of its own, but
instead serves as a "general attentional resource that (coordinates) the
contributions of different storage subsystems" (Richardson, p. 22).
Some of the experiments to show this had subjects generate a random
sequence of letters. The results of these are described by Baddeley (1990):
After about the first 15 or 20 letters, most people find the task
becoming increasingly difficult, with the same few letters tending
to crop up, and with a tendency for sequences to follow stereotyped
patterns such as the alphabet, or familiar acronyms such as CIA,
VD and BBC ... If one systematically varies the rate at which the
subject is required to generate letters, then a very lawful pattern
emerges, with the randomness increasing with the logarithm of the
time available ... Another way of manipulating the task is to vary
the number of alternatives, requiring the subject to generate on the
basis of two, four, sixteen, or twenty-six letters. This leads to a
systematic decrease in the rate at which letters are produced that
levels off after about eight alternatives. This suggests that subjects
can cope with up to about eight alternatives simultaneously, with
smaller numbers of items allowing more attention and faster
selection; once the system's capacity has been reached, adding
further alternatives will not affect performance since the system
will still be operating on its maximum of seven or eight options.
This task requires some organization and planning, which was the suggested
function of the central executive. Other experiments have used this result to
occupy the central executive and show its contribution in certain tasks.
1.4.3 Long-term memory
From the previous discussion of working memory, it seems obvious that our
long-term memory system is significantly different from working or short-term
memory. Its duration is much longer, and its capacity is much higher, both
essentially infinite. Yet often recall of this information is time consuming or
impossible. The strongest evidence for separate systems, however, is that in
studies from brain-damaged patients long-term and short-term memory systems
are affected separately from one another.
Two main theories of long-term memory have arisen. The first distinguishes
"episodic" memory and "semantic" memory. Episodic memory is simple
knowledge, events and facts. Semantic memory is knowledge that relates
concepts and information, rules about language and general world knowledge. A
second distinguishes implicit and explicit knowledge. The latter is more recent,
and the distinction between implicit and explicit is of little value to the application
of long-term memory to air traffic control.
1.4.4 Episodic memory
One important feature of episodic memory is the effect of rehearsal. While the
specifics of the rehearsal mechanism have been debated, the basic concepts
remain, and are fairly intuitive. Items rehearsed repeatedly, and elaboratively
(using the meaning of an item rather than its form), are recalled better than those
not repeated, or repeated in a maintenance-type manner. This latter type of
rehearsal is characterized by the item usually not being recalled once rehearsal
ceases, such as repeating a phone number until it is dialed. Elaborative rehearsal
establishes context for the item and relationships between it and other items in
long-term memory.
Another aspect of episodic memory is retrieval. It has been shown that items
in long-term memory do not suffer decay over time. Affecting recall, however,
are congruity, interference, and distinctiveness. These things can make items
inaccessible, but not lost from memory. The current view holds that items in
long-term memory cannot be lost, they remain there permanently, except in cases
of physical damage to, or incapacitation of, the brain.
Congruity refers to the heightened ability of people to recall things, if told to
recall them under the same conditions they remembered them. A simple
example is when someone is asked to list the alphabet. If done in order,
remembering is fast and easy since that is the way they were taught. Recall is
much slower and more prone to errors if done in any other order. Other
experiments have shown that when shown items as pictures, those items are
recalled more easily when presented with pictorial cues, rather than word cues or
other types of cues. This is also referred to as the effect of "mode".
Distinctiveness has been shown to aid the recall of events as well. This refers
to not only how remarkable a particular stimulus is, but to real-life dramatic
events as well. Memory experts suggest that when we want to remember
something, to think of a bizarre or distorted image of it, creating distinctiveness.
Dramatic events, such as the Kennedy assassination and Challenger accident,
have been shown to improve recall of information associated with the events.
1.4.5 Semantic memory
Episodic memory is insufficient, however, to accomplish human activity and
understanding. If it were, computers would be able to perform all human
function. The interrelation of information, the application of principles to
situations, the extrapolation of meaning, in short the sum total of useful human
function, requires semantic memory.
One attempt to understand semantic memory started back in the late 1960s,
when Quillian (1969) constructed a semantic network, initially interested in
teaching a computer to read a sentence. This idea of semantic memory as a
network associating concepts to one another in memory has since been refined
considerably, and has a great deal of merit in cognitive science. Baddeley (1990)
suggests that it may be more of a modeling language than actually descriptive of
physical memory. Despite concerns such as these, however, network techniques
in cognitive modeling are extremely powerful and descriptive, and in many ways
match the physical characteristics of the brain.
A competing model to Quillian's network is referred to as Bartlett's concept
of schema. In 1932 Sir Frederic Bartlett proposed an interpretation of memory
in which subjects used schemas to remember information. Little else was done
with this until computers were developed to the point that they could help test
Bartlett's theory. Marvin Minsky (1975), Rumelhart (1975), and Schank (1975)
developed this theory along similar lines.
Schemas are packets of information, larger in scope than the nodes in the
network model discussed above. They also can contain a wide range of
information, from concrete items to very abstract concepts. A schema represents
knowledge rather than definitions. Schemas are actively applied to perception to
accomplish understanding.
This is by no means a complete description of episodic nor semantic memory.
Several important theories and features have been omitted. I have attempted to
concentrate on those theories and features of direct relevance to air traffic
control, which will be discussed shortly.
1.5 Situational awareness and mental models
So far I have described the disparate elements of how memory operates.
These elements can be readily seen when dealing with relatively simple recall.
Memory is of course used in accomplishing more complicated activities as well.
Normal activity such as carrying on conversations, driving a car, playing sports or
games, flying and controlling aircraft are all examples.
In analyzing how humans successfully accomplish these activities, the terms
"situational awareness" and "mental models" have arisen. The most commonly
accepted definition of situational awareness comes from Endsley (1988), who
says it is the "perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their
status in the near future." A mental model is the representation of the task or
object, including its properties, states and interrelationships with other objects or
events. This model is within the mind of the subject, and is sometimes
incomplete or inaccurate when compared with the actual task or object.
Situational awareness (SA) is a term that is used frequently in aviation. When a
pilot or controller has good situational awareness, they have knowledge of all (or
almost all) of the information required to make successful choices. One criticism
of this concept is that the set of information required to make good choices can
easily be considered nearly infinite. SA can be expanded to include nearly every
element involved in a task, causing every error to be attributed to "poor SA".
This approach does not lead to fruitful solutions.
Mental models have been used longer, and for a broader class of phenomena,
than SA. Subjects develop a mental representation of the task, and use this to
understand the data being received from the task, and to formulate action.
Everyone has a mental model of their home, and could probably walk through
most of it with their eyes closed. Positions of furniture are generally (perhaps not
exactly) known. If we hear a sound from another room we can generally guess
what it might be. Sometimes we may hear a sound we don't recognize, and upon
finding it is coming from an open window, we add that sound (and its cause) to
our mental model.
The two terms, then, overlap to some extent. Aviation researchers tend to use
situational awareness, particularly when discussing a subject's recall of the
environment. Cognitive researchers tend to use mental models, with recall being
separate from the model. My approach will be the latter, since the task





Miller demonstrated that the span of immediate memory for one-dimensional
stimuli is 7±2 items. One method to skirt that limitation is through clustering.
Subjects in a study by Bousfield (1953) were asked to recall words from a long
list. Rather than recall them in the order in which they were presented (or
randomly), subjects recalled words in categories, such as "doctor, lawyer, fireman;
fly, mosquito, spider; dog, cat, horse". Numerous experiments confirmed that
this tendency is a necessary condition for long-term storage of information, and
better organization led to better recall. Even in experiments using words
apparently unrelated to one another, subjects would group items in some fashion
to aid in remembering the items.
This grouping of unrelated items can be done in numerous ways. Making up
sentences that include the words, forming images including the items and other
mnemonics are all useful. These strategies are presented as methods to improve
memory and recall, and have demonstrated startling results. Subjects trained in
such methods can perform remarkable feats of memory, such as memorizing the
contents of a magazine in 10 minutes. In such a magazine-remembering
demonstration, the subject could recall all the details, including content and
location, of any page called out at random.
Chunking is not limited to a conscious application of grouping schemes. If
asked to recall a 22-letter sequence given only 2 seconds, most people would
doubt their ability to accomplish this task. However, if that sequence is
"TAKEMEOUTTOTHEBALLGAME", the task is a simple one. This type of
chunking is automatic, using schemes that we have already internalized. The
same can be done with any other type of information - a large set of lines that
form the image of a house would be easier to recall than a random configuration.
It is not surprising, then, that grouping schemes have been found in a number
of complex activities. Waiters and waitresses have been shown to have a
specialized, automatic memorization scheme that helps them attribute orders to
spatial locations. Links were formed between orders and the spatial locations of
patrons, allowing the waitperson to recall up to 8 orders (about 20 menu items).
Chess players have also shown sophisticated yet internalized and automatic
grouping strategies involving spatial relationships.
2.2 Object vs. space-based theories of attention
In order to understand perceptual organization, psychologists have examined
how a person's attention is focused when viewing an object. Two main views of
the process of attention have developed.
One view holds that attention is like a spotlight. A person's gaze tracks and
holds on certain parts of a scene. Attention parses the perceived scene, and
features within a certain radius of this focus are attended. Those outside are not.
This locus of attention need not be "all-or-nothing". Generally comprehension
of features decreases as the distance from the focus of attention increases, rather
than sharply dropping off at some predefined radius. However, any items within
the locus of attention are all attended. Figure 1 shows a configuration of three
letters. Generally it would be impossible (under object-based theories of
attention) to attend to "A" and "C" without also attending to "B".
Figure 1. Spotlight locus of attention.
Support for space-based theories comes from numerous experiments.
Downing and Pinker (1985) showed that detection time for luminance changes
increased as the distance from the focus of attention increased. Hoffman and
Nelson (1981) presented subjects with a four-letter display, with an open box
superimposed on the image. The subjects were asked to determine which of two
letters were not in the display, as well as the orientation of the box. Subjects were
more accurate when the box was adjacent to the target letter. Similar support for
space-based theories comes from LaBerge (1983), Podgorny and Shepard (1983)
and Posner, Snyder and Davidson (1980).
In contrast to space-based attention is object-based attention. This theory
assumes that attention is focused on one or more objects in the scene, regardless
of location within the scene. Duncan (1984) superimposed two images, then
asked subjects in one case to report two attributes of one object, or one attribute
of each object in another case. Subjects were more accurate reporting two
attributes of one object, despite both objects being within the locus of attention.
Neisser and Becklen overlapped two sequences on videotape, then asked subjects
to view the tapes and report any anomalous events in one or the other of the
sequences. For example, if the video showed a pair of hands clapping
superimposed on a group of people playing catch, an anomalous event would be
one of the subjects leaving and returning. Subjects performed very well in this
task, but rarely noticed anomalous events in the unattended sequence.
Ongoing research by Kanwisher (1999, personal conversation) has identified
specific regions of the brain that activate when a face is presented. This region is
activated only for faces, not for other objects such as houses. During this
experiment subjects were presented with independent images in either eye. The
"faciform" region of the brain would activate and deactivate as the subject's
attention switched between the two images, both of which were being received
by the brain. Subjects reported the same phenomenon, that of one image
switching with the other, similar to the effect of a Necker cube.
While these results do not completely contradict space-based theories, they do
show that there is at least some object-based influence to attention.
2.3 Bottom-up vs. top-down
If perceptual objects influence our attention, what determines the form of the
perceptual object? Perceptual organization has long been considered a purely
stimulus-driven, bottom-up process. This means that organization is influenced
by the image properties alone, regardless of the goals of the task or the relative
importance of the features. Typical features regarded as important are proximity,
similarity, common motion, symmetry and good form ("Prignanz").
2.3.1 Gistalt psychology
One of the original Gestalt psychologists was Max Wertheimer. He published a
very influential paper in 1923 that laid the framework for the Gestalt movement.
Gestaltists believe that we do not experience a number of things, but rather
larger, interrelated wholes.
Wertheimer's original examples used dots. When we see a picture such as that
shown below, it is natural to see the dots as being grouped. In fact, it can be
difficult to see them any other way. This figure demonstrates what Wertheimer
called the "Factor of Proximity." In this case the dots close to one another are
grouped.
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Figure 2. Factor of proximity (Wertheimer, 1923).
The second factor is the "Factor of Similarity". If we take the same dots, space
them equally, but change their color or shape, we again see grouping. One tends
to group like objects together. This similarity factor is affected by the magnitude
of dissimilarity as well. So if some of the dots were white, some black, and some
shades of red, the shades of red would tend to be grouped together. If they were
all shades of red, however, the different shades would be grouped separately.
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Figure 3. Factor of similarity (Wertheimer, 1923).
If we take a group of dots, and shift several of them suddenly, the grouping of
those dots may change in response. If they were previously grouped by
proximity, the dots may subsequently be grouped according to shift in position.
This is referred to as the "Factor of Common Fate" or "Uniform Density".
There are other factors as well. They all have one thing in common: certain
arrangements are more compelling than other arrangements. Our perception of a
scene is powerfully influenced by Gestalt factors.
Kanizsa figures provide further evidence for the power of this grouping
mechanism. We can see triangles and circles in figures 4 and 5 where none exist,
because our brains fill in the missing information. When creating a sphere on a
computer screen, the three-dimensional look is supplied by subtle and continuous
shading. The human viewing this sphere would not see the continuous color
shading that actually exists, but rather small polygons of equal shading separated
by dark lines. These dark lines are our mind inserting edges where none exist;
this illusion is well known within the discipline of computer graphics.
Figure 4. Kanisza figure.
Figure 5. More Kanisza figures.
Gestalt factors are, therefore, very commonly used in imparting structure on a
visual task. In many cases they are automatic, and difficult or impossible to alter.
Some of the factors that regulate grouping are top-down or imposed somehow
on the stimulus. Wertheimer included "past experience or habit" as one of the
factors involved in grouping. Through training or experience, subjects could
come to see patterns contrary to the Gestalt factors mentioned above.
Proshansky and Murphy (1942) showed that subjects could change their
perception of lines when the punishment/reward system was changed. There has
been a large body of work following along the lines of the famous Pavlov's dog
experiment that showed subjects, when shown a pair of stimuli together
frequently enough, would actually see both stimuli when presented with only one.
Bruner (1947) showed that social and cultural factors, and even age, impacts
perception of organization. Bruner (1949) also showed that while incongruity
factors (such as playing cards where the suit colors were reversed) caused an
increase in reaction time, once the subject expected incongruity this delay was
eliminated.
The fact that one can intentionally switch attention when viewing a Necker
cube is another example of this. Given a goal and proper training, perceptual
organization can be influenced.
2.4 Perceptual group formation
Pylyshyn and Storm (1988) had subjects visually track a small number of target
objects moving about a display among a number of identical non-target objects.
At various times an object would flash and the subject would have to identify it as
either target or non-target. Despite this task being highly demanding, subjects
correctly identified over 90% of the objects. Further experiments showed that
this result was inconsistent with the "spotlight" theory of attention. The
conclusion was that the targets were being cognitively "indexed", allowing
tracking independently of the visual task.
Yantis (1992) proposed that the targets are attended, but that they are grouped
into a virtual object. It is this virtual object which is tracked. A similar
experiment was performed, but the ability to group the targets into a virtual
object was varied.
Previous work had determined that formation of virtual objects is a two-step
process. The initial formation of the virtual object is stimulus-driven, controlled
by the same bottom-up factors mentioned earlier (proximity, similarity, common
motion, symmetry, Pragnanz). Once the object is formed, it must be maintained
by reviewing the configuration of elements and updating the object if necessary.
Yantis first varied the factors that influence formation. Significant
improvement in the task occurred, but only in the early trials. Subjects eventually
learned to efficiently group targets, even when they were configured randomly. A
next set of experiments varied the factors that control maintenance of the virtual
object. Performance improved when maintenance was simplified. These results
validate the earlier suggestion that perceptual grouping can be influenced by the
objectives of the task. Subjects were able to track a virtual object from within a
random configuration of identical elements.
ATC is in some respects a target-tracking task. As such perceptual grouping
should play a significant role. Means et al. (1988) found evidence that aircraft are
grouped in memory with related aircraft. Other research has suggested aircraft
are recalled with respect to the sector, indicating a space-based attentional
scheme.
Dougherty et al. (1997) conducted experiments to test the source of groupings
in ATC. Controllers were run through an air traffic simulator, which was
stopped at random intervals. Subjects then attempted to recreate the position
and information of the targets on a map.
To demonstrate the presence of groupings, the subjects were videotaped
performing the recall task to obtain timing information. Previous cognitive
research has shown that if items are perceptually grouped, recall of one item
facilitates recall of the other members of the group, resulting in decreased recall
times. An example of this concept is if one were asked to list all possible first
names. It is likely that the names of friends and acquaintances would be recalled
in rapid succession, followed by a pause as other groups of people are recalled.
No such clusters appeared for the controllers in this task, suggesting that no
aircraft-to-aircraft links exist. Although accuracy of recall was not reported for
this experiment, it has been shown to be excellent in previous experiments.
Controllers placed 95% of the aircraft in their sector within 10 nautical miles of
their actual position in an experiment by Means et al. (1988). Recall was 90% in a
study by Gronlund, Dougherty et al. (1997), most placed within 2.5 cm of their
actual position. Gronlund, Ohrt, et al. (1997) found a 79.6% recall rate, with an
average miss distance of about 9.6 nautical miles. Controllers reported an average
of 8 aircraft (out of an average of 12.8 visible) with a mean distance error of 9.6
miles in an experiment by Endsley and Rogers (1996).
Since there were on average 14 aircraft in the sector in most of the
aforementioned experiments, it is unlikely that this recall is due to strict
memorization. Furthermore, the normal workloads of a controller would hinder
memorization. An alternate suggestion is that there are aircraft to sector links
that guide retrieval, although no suggestions for how this mechanism might work
have been forwarded as yet.
One difficulty in using recall information to determine perceptual grouping in
ATC tasks is the inability of subjects to remember the details being asked. In
Means et al. (1988), controllers could associate aircraft types to call sign with a
28% accuracy. For ground speeds, recall was only 6%. Subjects in the Gronlund,
Ohrt, et al. (1998) study recalled 56.5% of the altitudes and 20.6% of the speeds
of traffic in their sector. Endsley and Rogers' (1996) subjects identified the
numerical part of the callsign with 38.4% accuracy, the correct altitude for 59.7%
of the aircraft, groundspeed for 28%, correct heading for 48.4% and reported
whether the aircraft was in a turn with only 35.1% accuracy. However,
controllers reported correctly 73.8% of the initial alphabetical part of the aircraft
callsign (which indicates the operating company) and reported the control level
(whether the aircraft was in their sector, about to be in their sector, etc.) also with
73.8% accuracy.
The better accuracy for altitude, control level and at least part of the call sign
suggests that there are some details controllers recall better than others. Yet
these details are all found in the data tag, at or near the iconic representation of
the aircraft. If spotlight theories of attention are correct, there should be little or
no difference in recall between these pieces of information. There is, therefore,




From the results of Dougherty at al. (1997), it was found that recall-timing
tests normally used to determine perceptual groups were ineffective. The finding
that certain pieces of information were recalled fairly well, while others were not
recalled suggests, however, that there is some clustering of the targets. An
alternative method of determining conflicts is to examine eye movements. As
will be shown, fixations on targets are, in the words of Stark & Choi (1996),
"repetitive and idiosyncratic to a particular picture and to a particular subject."
3.2 Eye movement basics
Eye movements can be separated into a sequence of fixations and the
movements between those fixations, called saccades. Most information is
perceived from foveal vision, high-resolution (approximately one-half arc-minute)
vision with a small field of view (approximately one-half degree). Peripheral
vision, on the other hand, has 120 to 180 degrees field of view, but is sensitive
only to flickering lights and motion.
Each aspect of vision can transmit about 40K bits per second. Foveal vision
has fewer pixels but a (relatively) high bits per pixel, while peripheral vision has
many pixels but generally only one bit per pixel. Given these limits, in order for a
person to perceive a complex scene and extract information from it, a sequence
of fixations and saccades must occur. A normal scene contains items of interest
areas of little interest or content. Some items of interest must be viewed for a
period of time to process the level of detail required.
Each of these fixations imparts a piece of the scene to the brain. This is a
rather sparse sampling of the information contained in the entire visual scene. In
the lightning example given earlier, a very brief exposure to a scene still provides
a sense of visual completeness to the subject. The subject, and each of us in
everyday life, sees the "whole" world before us, even though only a small fraction
of the information available reaches our brain. Stark & Choi (1996) refers to this
as the "illusion of completeness".
3.3 Scanpath
If only a small part of the scene is actually viewed, there must be a mechanism
for selecting what parts of the scene to view. One would expect to find the eye
fixating on some area of interest, move to another, then another, and so on until
as much as possible of the scene is viewed. This turns out not to be the case.
Noton and Stark (1971) showed that these sequences of fixations were
"idiosyncratic" and "repetitive". Subjects' eye movements when viewing a scene
showed repeated fixations on particular items of interest, and a pattern for
revisiting those items which was different for different subjects, but generally
consistent for an individual subject. An example of a scanpath is seen in figure 6.
The white ovals are fixations, the white lines are saccades. If the same subject
viewed this picture again, or a similar picture, the scanpath would be very similar.
If a different subject viewed it, the same features would be viewed, but the
scanpath would be different.
Figure 6. Scanpath (Privatera, 1999).
One opinion holds that features of the stimulus control fixations. Our eye is
drawn to areas of contrast or some other objective criteria that is distinct from
the object as a whole, or the goal of our viewing. The scanpath theory holds that
an internal model of the object directs fixations. Fixations are a method of
comparing and updating the model. The "illusion of completeness" that we have
of the world being viewed is formed from the internal model and the sampling
achieved by the scanpath.
Further support for the scanpath theory comes from viewing of ambiguous
figures. Ambiguous figures are pictures which "switch" from one picture to
another when viewed. Ellis and Stark (1978) showed that when attention shifted
from one figure to another (such as from the vase to the opposing faces in figure
7), the scanpath changed as well.
Figure 7. Ambiguous figure.
The most convincing evidence comes from Brandt et al. (1989). Subjects
viewed three different patterns of Xs, then were first asked to visualize the
patterns on a blank screen, then draw the patterns on a blank screen. Similarity
analysis of the visualized object's scanpath showed strong agreement with the
scanpath of the viewed patterns. No stimulus was available to the eye or brain
when visualizing, yet nearly the same scanpath resulted, confirming that a top-





In a strict sense, air traffic control falls in the realm of manual control. No
control loops are closed by automation, so that if the controller walks away from
the scope, all control actions stop. There is significant processing of data by the
computers, but they perform no actions on the aircraft. In a looser sense,
however, the controller does act in a supervisory control role. Sheridan (1992)





5. learning from experience
While these were meant to refer to automation (in the cases of 2, 3, and 4),
they can equally apply to a process. Figure 8 is taken from a report on air traffic
control complexity (Wyndemere, 1996). Note the similarities between this figure
and Sheridan's five basic functions.






Figure 8. Mental and physical processes required in
ATC.
An analogy can be made between the teaching/programming function and the
controller's sometimes-subtle interaction with other agents in the air traffic
control system. In performing his/her duties, the controller informs (often
implicitly) the other agents what the plan is for each aircraft to arrive at their goal
state (landing at an airport, climbing/descending, traversing a sector to a fix, etc.).
The controller automates the process of controlling to some extent by
distributing information (either directly through instructions or comments, or via
the fact that much of the information is shared through the party-line nature of
the communications system).
The controller does not have control-performing automation to monitor. The
conflict detection process, and the need for the controller to monitor compliance
to instructions, can be substituted for this however. Controllers issue
instructions, require the pilot to read back the instructions, and monitor the
pilot's compliance to those instructions.
The controller also does not need to intervene in the sense of supplementing
or taking over automatic control activities. The controller does need, however, to
intervene in the normal sequence of events to prevent conflicts or increase
efficiency.
So it is in this sense that we apply supervisory control concepts to air traffic
control. Although there is no control-producing automation (at least not yet), the
human interacts with the process in much the same way as a human operator
interacts with automation. The analyses normally applied to automation can be
applied to the human.
4.2 Workload and complexity
In describing the difficulty of a complex task, researchers try to define the
terms "complexity" and "workload". There is some difficulty in ascribing
objective values to these terms when evaluating tasks such as air traffic control.
Complexity is independent of the subject, and can be viewed as a function of the
number of states or possible events attributable to the task. Workload is usually
broken into the amount of physical work being accomplished (physical workload)
and the amount of cognitive work being accomplished (mental workload).
Mental workload has been very difficult to measure. Objective measures are
task dependent, and their accuracy relies on our ability to understand what makes
a task difficult mentally. Subjective measures are somewhat more reliable, and
different scales have been developed. One such scale commonly used in aviation
is a Cooper-Harper scale. This was used to evaluate the controllability of new
aircraft designs. The subject would follow a decision tree, answering questions
about errors, ability to perform the task, and mental workload to attribute a
number to the mental workload. This scale has been modified for use in
numerous other experiments. Sheridan and Simpson (1979) developed a three-
dimensional scale, which separated out "time load", "mental effort load" and
"stress load". The subject chooses the description which best fits their
experience to come up with a rating in each category. This scale was used in the
experiment described in the following sections.
The experiments which follow were intended to test subjects' ability to
monitor conflicts and perform secondary tasks when confronted with high
workload situations. Sheridan (1992) showed that as workload increases,
performance does not degrade significantly, up to a point. Beyond that, very
small increases in workload cause precipitous decreases in performance.
Additionally, at very high workload situations, subjects begin to adopt an
attention-switching strategy. In this situation they are no longer able to perform
the task in an orderly fashion, but tend to "sample" the task, and performance
suffers as a result. Conversely, if workload is too low, vigilance suffers and
performance also declines.
4.3 ROC analysis
Of particular interest in this paper is the application of the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve from signal-detection theory. This has been discussed
and used in the context of human supervisory control for several years (see
Sheridan, 1992; Kuchar, 1995).
In this analysis, one normally would crossplot the probability of having a false
alarm (an alert issued when none is required), against the probability of having a
missed detection (no alert issued when one is required). The result is a receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The curve demonstrates a tradeoff
between increasing correct detections and false alarms. For example, in a purely
guessing strategy, the ROC would be a straight line connecting (0,0) with (1,1).
As the system improves, the center of the curve distends towards the (0,1) point
(upper left corner). This point is where we would have perfect correct detections
and zero false alarms. The closer one gets to this point, the better the alerting
system.
In automated alerting systems, only improving the sensors can modify the
curve. In the human context, the curve can be improved through training,
altering procedures, using different controllers, or other ways of modifying the
conditions of the task or the human operator. The point on the curve at which
one operates, however, can generally be changed easily. In an automated system,
changing alert thresholds would accomplish this. For a human-based system,





Given the substantial evidence that top-down perceptual organization occurs
in accomplishing complex tasks, and that eye movement is indicative of this
organization, it was endeavored to examine whether this organization could be
captured in an experimental setting. A first experiment manipulated factors
which were expected to affect workload to determine if those factors might be a
basis for clustering. A second experiment used an eye-tracking device to detect
cognitive groupings. If air traffic controllers were perceptually organizing traffic,
then the ease with which this organization occurs should impact task
performance.
As noted earlier, previous attempts using recall techniques to capture
perceptual grouping have been inconclusive. It was surmised that this is due to
the generally poor level of recall of details often asked in recall questionnaires. If
this is the case, recall may be poor, while task performance should remain good.
5.2 Experiment 1
The first experiment described below was an effort to examine recall and
performance levels, and to establish elements of complexity to be examined as
potential grouping criteria.
5.2.1 Setup and design
The experiments were run on a 486-based PC using a target-tracking program
written by the author in C/C++. A typical screen is shown in figure 9. Each
cycle the screen was updated and all targets moved. A cycle was a program
timeout of 1000 msec, although the actual event time was slightly less
(approximately 990 msec) due to the way Microsoft Windows processes these
timeout events.
Figure 9. Experiment 1 screen shot.
The subject's task was to accept targets as they appeared on the screen (by
using the mouse to select the target and pressing the "A" key), "handoff" the
targets before they left the screen (by using the mouse to select the target and
pressing the "H" key), and monitor for conflicts. A conflict was defined as any
targets within 10 levels of each other that would touch as they traversed the
screen. For instance, if one target was at level 200 and another was at level 190,
and the subject believed they were going to collide on the screen eventually, he
would select the two targets as a conflict (by using the mouse to select the two
targets and pressing "C"). The subject was also asked to deselect pairs no longer
in danger of conflicting, but this instruction was routinely ignored and was
removed from the analysis.
This latter finding may be of interest if studied further. There may be a
distinction between tracking an individual target and a combined pair of targets,
and it may be difficult to focus on the two things simultaneously. In other words,
if the subject was supposed to track only pairs of potentially conflicting aircraft, it
may be easy to do. However here the subject was supposed to track individual
aircraft (accepting, handing off, watching for conflicts), and it may be difficult to
combine tracking individual targets with pairs of targets.
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The experiment consisted of 3 subjects performing the target tracking and
monitoring task. The subjects were male M.I.T. graduate students. Two of the
subjects performed three sets of 12 trials, and the remaining subject performed
two sets of 12 trials. Each trial was five minutes in duration, with the
configuration of the trial varying over the set of 12 trials, as shown in table 1.
"Speed differences" set to "no" means that all targets had a speed of 3
pixels/cycle (a cycle is approximately one second in this program). If set to
"yes", it means that speed for each target was randomly chosen from 1 to 5
pixels/cycle. "Level changes" set to "no" means that all targets remain at the
assigned level (randomly set between 100 and 200) throughout the trial. If set to
"yes", targets were given a random starting level, a random finishing level and a
random time (set for sometime during the traversal of the screen) to
descend/climb to that finishing level.
Trial Targets Speed Level
differences Changes
1 6 No No
2 6 Yes No
3 6 No Yes
4 6 Yes Yes
5 12 No No
6 12 Yes No
7 12 No Yes
8 12 Yes Yes
9 18 No No
10 18 Yes No
11 18 No Yes
12 18 Yes Yes
Table 1. Experiment matrix.
The subjects ran through at least one long trial to eliminate learning curve
effects, and to ensure there were no questions about how to perform the
different actions used in the experiment. The delays and errors in accepting and
handing off targets, the conflict detection error rate (false alarms, missed
detections, correct detections and correct rejections), and the lead times in
determining conflicts were all measured.
If a user did not accept a target within the first 60 seconds of it being on
screen, an acceptance error was recorded. If the user failed to handoff a target
prior to its leaving the screen, a handoff error was recorded. False alarm and
missed detection results were normalized to the number of crossing to obtain
percentages. This was done because some targets did not approach other targets,
indeed some weren't even on the screen at the same time. So I attempted to
obtain an accurate picture of when a user might reasonably infer a collision
potential, and capture the difficulty of the scenario. 150 pixels were used after
analyzing the data and finding an outer limit of when a user definitely wouldn't
detect a conflict.
5.2.2 Results
The pertinent results of the experiments are included as figures 11 to 15. A
definition page precedes this (figure 10).
Definitions
Figure 10. Definitions
Figures 11 and 12 show the correct detection and false alarm rates,
respectively. The correct detection rate is perfect for 6 targets, and drops off to a
low of about 38% for one of the 18 target trials. The false alarm rate,
interestingly, is higher for the six target trials than for the more difficult trials. The
initial suspicion was that this was due to inattention caused by low workload, or
perhaps the subject was merely "creating work" for himself. Figure 13 suggests
another reason, however.
Errors:
- Missed acceptances (>60 sec)
- Missed handoffs
FA = false alarms
- not conflicting due to altitude
- not conflicting due to distance
MD = missed detection
CD = correct detection
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Figure 12. False alarm rate
Figure 13 shows the detection lead times, which is the amount of time prior to
the closest point of approach that the subject chose two targets as potentially
conflicting. As the number of targets increases, this time gets shorter. This helps
explain why the number of false alarms increased at lower numbers of targets.










Figure 13. Detection lead times vs. trial number
It was then undertaken to show the correlation between false alarm rate and
prediction time. Figure 14 shows this correlation. As the lead times increase, the
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Figure 14. False alarm rate vs. detection lead time.
The ROC curve is shown as figure 15. The effect of increasing complexity is
to increase the number of missed detections, while decreasing complexity
increases false alarms. The detection performance is perfect for 6 targets, with
missed detections increasing rapidly as the number of targets increases to 18.
The number of false alarms averages about 4% for the combined subjects and 18









0 r1 01 0'1 01 0 r (30 1 01 01 01 01
P(FA)
Figure 15. ROC for target tracking task.
5.2.3 Experiment 1- discussion
The number of aircraft in the scenario was the largest contributor to
complexity. At 18 targets, subjects indicated they began to adopt a switching
strategy, where targets are randomly scanned. This is typical of subjects
overloaded in a target-tracking task. The 12 target scenarios were more easily
managed. The fact that a typical controller workload is also in this range could be
a coincidence, but there also may be an underlying reason for this number.
The main result of this experiment was to show that as the subject had more
time to perform the task (lower workload), the number of missed detections went
down at the expense of higher false alarms. This was due to a longer detection
lead time. As the lead time increases, the accuracy of the projection of
trajectories decreases, resulting in more false alarms. Increasing workload,
thereby reducing spare time, had the opposite effect of raising missed detections
and lowering false alarms.
Discussions with the subjects also showed that recall for data tag information
is very poor. In most cases the information was not recalled at all. Subjects
reported that they had seen the information, but had no ability to recall it.
5.3 Experiment 2
5.3.1 Setup and design
Since the contributions of complexity were proving difficult to identify using
recall and performance measures, an eye tracker device was purchased. This
would provide input into software developed by Yufik (1996) that would return
grouping information. The experimental software was also replaced. A Visual
Basic program was developed which was very similar to the C program used in
the first experiment. This allowed the use of database information for scenario
generation and data collection, greatly simplifying both. The experimental set up
is shown in Appendix 1.
The purpose of experiment 2 was to attempt to correlate grouping information
with some objective criteria, such as recall, performance, or task objectives. Nine
new scenarios were developed. The number of targets would remain constant
(approximately 14) to remove this effect from performance. The interface was
simplified to eliminate the need to use the keyboard, since this would be outside
of the range of the eye tracker.
The variables in the nine scenarios were configuration and number of potential
conflicts. The three configurations used were canonical, sequenced and random.
The canonical configurations used are geometric, and have the "good form"
described by Gastaltists. Three scenarios were developed which contained
canonical configurations of traffic. In one case a diamond shape cluster of traffic
moved from the upper right comer of the screen to the lower left. In a second
scenario one diamond-shaped formation and one triangular formation were used.
In a third a triangle formation was used. Sequenced configurations have
"common fate", appearing to move in the same direction. Three scenarios had
sequenced configurations. In these scenarios there was a predominant flow of
traffic along a predefined path, with about 50% of the total traffic volume
moving along the sequenced route. This route begins (and ends) at a geographic
point and continues in either direction. In one scenario two of these flows were
apparent. In random scenarios care was taken to avoid any canonical or
sequenced configurations while randomly dispersing targets across the screen,
with each moving in a semi-random direction. Directions were not completely
random so as to avoid the configurations mentioned above, and to keep the
targets on the screen for the desired amount of time.
The number of conflicts was varied between high (around 5), low (around 1)
and none. Targets were randomly assigned an altitude from either flight level
(FL) 310 (31,000 feet), FL330, FL350, FL370 or FL390. A wind speed and
direction was randomly assigned to the scenario and groundspeeds were
calculated (approximately) by adding wind velocity to a true airspeed (TAS)
velocity of 400 knots. Groundspeeds ranged from 340 to 480 knots.
Scenario number Configuration Coaltitude crossings Actual conflicts
1 Sequenced 25 5
2 Random 18 3
3 Sequenced 10 0
4 Canonical 17 1
5 Random 15 0
6 Random 18 7
7 Canonical 16 5
8 Sequenced 15 2
9 Canonical 11 1
Table 2 Experiment matrix.
All acceptances, handoffs, and detections of conflicts were recorded, including
the scenario time for each action. From this data were extracted lag times for
acceptances, missed acceptances, missed handoffs, lead times for detections,
missed detection counts and false alarm counts.
5.3.1.1 Eye movement monitoring system
An Iscan, Inc. Eye Movement Monitoring System was used to record eye
movement data. This system consists of a standard video camera attached to a
pan and tilt unit which images the subject's eye, an IL-400 Infrared Illuminator,
an RK-464 Remote Eye Imaging System, an RK-520 Autocalibration System and
an RK-426 Pupil/Corneal Reflection Tracking System. Two monitors provide
feedback to the experimentor. The experimentor can view the output of the eye-
imaging camera on one monitor (eye monitor). The other monitor redisplays
video output from the monitor that the subject is viewing (scene monitor). The
scene monitor was output to a video recorder for playback and analysis.
The IL-400 Illuminator is a 20 watt incandescent light source mounted behind
a glass infrared pass filter, housed in a cylindrical assembly. Both the intensity
and direction of the light source can be adjusted. This unit provides an infrared
(IR) light source for the RK-426, without being visible to the subject.
The RK-426 is a real-time digital image processor that tracks the center of a
subject's pupil and a reflection of IR illumination off of the cornea. Input is
received from the video camera centered on the subject's eye. Areas of the eye
except the pupil reflect the IR, while the pupil acts as a sink, resulting in a dark
pupil image. It is this image which is tracked by the unit. The cornea, the curved
surface of the eye behind the pupil, then reflects the IR. The unit automatically
tracks the positions of the pupil and corneal reflection (CR) over a two-
dimensional matrix of the eye-imaging camera. Changes in the subject's gaze
angle are calculated from these positions.
The RK-426 divides the subject eye video into a 512 x 256 pixel field, and the
coordinates of the center of the pupil and CR are updated every 16.7 msec and
recorded. Accuracy of the system is dependent on the size of the eye image.
Tighter zooming results in a larger eye image, more pixels per millimeter, and
better resolution. This is done at a cost of diminished range of head movements.
Typically, eye movements of ±150 can be accommodated. Subjects wearing
glasses and contacts were successfully calibrated during the course of the trials.
The RK-520PC is a real-time computation and display unit that calculates a
subject's point-of-regard with respect to the viewed scene. A cursor is overlaid
on the operator scene monitor, and the output can be saved and analyzed by
software included with the system.
The system requires a calibration procedure to associate the relative position of
the eye camera with the subject's eye. The calibration requires the user to fixate
on five known points on the screen, one at a time. The operator indicates when
the user is fixating on the points, and correlating factors are calculated. These
correlating factors are used to determine point-of-regard for subsequent eye
movements. Calibrations were performed before each trial. Once calibration
was complete, subjects were asked to fixate on the calibration points again to
manually check the calibration.
The video scene being viewed by the subject is divided into 512 x 256 pixels.
The raw pupil and CR positions are correlated to a pixel position on the viewed
scene.
The RK-464 allows the operator to control the direction, focus, magnification
and iris of the eye-imaging camera. Once the eye image is manually acquired, it is
operated in an automatic mode where the camera automatically keeps the pupil
centered in the field of view. The automatic mode is effective within ±12 inches
horizontally by ±4 inches vertically of head movement.
5.3.1.2 Yufik software
An efficient method for calculating groupings was developed by Yufik (1996).
This software initially was developed to speed computation of target-allocation
problems, which have shown clustering characteristics. The software defines
nodes (in our case targets), and forms links between these nodes based on some
defined criteria. In this experiment the links were formed by incrementing links
between two targets when transitions between those two targets took place, and
weighting the link by the fixation durations.
A "virtual network" is thereby formed, with nodes linked to other nodes with
different weights. Clusters are formed when the sum of the weights internal to a
sequence of nodes exceeds the weights of all external links. Essentially the
software returns clusters of targets among which repetitive patterns of fixations
have been demonstrated.
5.3.1.3 Method
Eighteen subjects were recruited to participate in the experiment. Subjects
were undergraduate or graduate students at M.I.T. Four subjects could not be
calibrated and were dismissed from the experiment. The remaining fourteen
subjects were generally untrained in air traffic control, although one subject had
140 flying hours, one subject had 70 flying hours, and those two subjects as well
has three others reported some experience with air traffic control concepts.
Subjects were paid $15.00 for their participation. No incentives for performance
were used.
Screen shots are shown in Appendix 2. When the trial was started, a number
of targets would appear on the screen. Any targets at the edge of the screen, or
those coming onto the screen after the trial was begun, needed to be "accepted".
Targets that needed to be accepted were indicated with a circle as the target icon.
Those already accepted were crosses. To accept a target the subject had to click
on the target, at which time the icon would change to a cross. Once targets had
traversed the screen and approached the edge, subjects were required to "hand
off' the targets. Handing off would be done by clicking on the target, which
would cause the target icon to be highlighted. The subject must then select a
menu item, "Handoff', which could be found under the "Controls" item. If the
target were close enough to the edge (approximately 5 NM) and were leaving the
screen through that edge, the target would then be removed from the screen.
The primary task of the subjects was to monitor the screen for conflicts. They
were instructed that all other tasks were secondary to detecting conflicting pairs
of targets. A conflict was any time two targets at the same altitude passed within
5 NM of each other. Double clicking on any target would bring up a 5 NM range
ring (called a "J-ball" by air traffic controllers). A conflict was identified by
clicking on the two (or more) targets, which would highlight them. Selecting
"Conflict" from the "Controls" menu would remove the highlight and add the
target pair to the "Conflict Pairs" menu. If more than two targets were selected,
the targets would be broken down into all possible pairs, with those pairs being
added to the "Conflict Pairs" menu.
Subjects were briefed to select conflicts as soon as they thought there might be
a chance of conflict, and to deselect them after the conflict potential (or actual
conflict) had passed. This was accomplished by selecting the pair to be
deselected from the "Conflict Pairs" menu. As in the first experiment,
deselection was almost universally ignored and was removed from the analysis.
Once the trial time limit was reached, target details would be erased and two
questionnaires appeared. The first questionnaire asked questions about three
targets. The same questions were asked for each trial and each subject, and the
same targets were asked for the same scenario for each subject. For each trial
three different targets were selected. Generally, one target was selected from a
conflict pair (except where there were no conflicts), one target was selected from
the canonical or sequenced configuration (if such a configuration existed for that
trial) and one was selected which was somewhat of an outlier. The questions
were specific to the target, and asked about speed, altitude and with which other
targets the subject target conflicted. The speed and altitude questions were
multiple choice, selected by check box. The conflict question was "fill-in-the-
blank". Subjects could choose any of the five possible altitudes as an answer, and
could choose either "below 400 knots", "400 knots" or "above 400 knots" as an
answer regarding speed.
The second questionnaire contained three questions, which were selected
pseudo-randomly from a list of 15 questions. The list of questions is shown in
table 3. The last three questions were the questions that appeared at the end of
the sample trial. Each question was chosen to be somewhat relevant to the
scenario, but no question was asked more than three times. The questions were
designed to be general questions about the scenario, rather than specific to any
one target.
1 How many conflict pairs were there?
7 In what portion of the screen were there conflicts?8 How many targets were travelling south, including southeast and southwest?
9. How many targets were travelling north, including northeast and northwest?
O 10 How many targets were travelling east, including southeast and northeast?
11 How many targets were travelling west, including northwest and southwest?12 How many targets were at FL390?3 How many targets weredid you hand off?
14 How many targets were travelling above including0 knotsheast and nort
15 How many targets were travelling below 360 knots?
16 Test Question 1?
17 Test Question 2?
18 Test Question 3?
Table 3. General questions.
Subjects were told to answer the target specific questions only if they were
sure. However, they could choose more than one answer. For instance, if they
knew that the target was at either FL310 or FL330, they could choose both
answers. For the question that asked about the conflicting targets, if they were
sure that no conflicts existed, they were told to answer "none".
Each subject signed a consent agreement and read instructions that gave a
general description of the research, although mentioned nothing about perceptual
grouping. The instructions indicated their tasks and how they would perform
them. Once any questions about the task were answered, subjects began a five-
minute sample trial to familiarize themselves with the task. During the trial they
were shown how to perform all required tasks and were allowed to ask any
questions they might have. If subjects had further questions, or demonstrated
some uncertainty about the task or controls, a second sample trial was run. At
the end of the sample trial the two questionnaire windows would open. The
subject was briefed on what to expect from the questionnaires and how to
answer them.
5.3.2 Results
The timing, recall and fixation data were collected, evaluated and correlated.
Specific recall questions were graded by how accurate the answer was, while
general recall questions were graded by how closely to the right answer the
subject answered. Fixation data was compared with target trajectories to correlate
a fixation with a target. Two methods were used to establish which, if any, target
was being observed. One method was to select the nearest target to the fixation.
A second method applied a weighting based on the fixation's proximity to the
target. The former method was used for input into the Yufik software. The
latter was used for all other analysis.
5.3.2.1 Raw data
As seen in the previous experiment, acceptance misses and lags are an indicator
of workload. In this task there was little correlation to acceptance lags, although






The results are somewhat consistent with expected workload. However,
scenario 3 had no conflicts, was sequenced and had only 10 coaltitude crossings.
These factors should have made it one of the easiest scenarios, and yet there were
a large number of missed acceptances. Likewise scenario 1 should have been
surprisingly low number of missed acceptances. Acceptance lags had large
surprisingly low number of missed acceptances. Acceptance lags had large
standard deviations, making it difficult to draw conclusions from the data. There
were only eight targets accepted in each scenario. This small number probably
resulted in the times seen below and the missed acceptances seen above being
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Figure 17. Acceptance lag times.
Conflict detection performance was poor in the task. Experiment 1
demonstrated that 12 targets were difficult for untrained subjects to track, and 18
were nearly impossible. These subjects appeared to have difficulty at 14 targets
per scenario. The number of missed detections was high, and the number of
false alarms low.
OUUl l[lU 0 111 V.V,* /0
Scenario 3 NA 4.11%
Scenario 4 78.6% 1.32%
Scenario 2 57.1% 1.87%
Scenario 8 50.0% 2.15%
Scenario 7 32.9% 1.91%
Scenario 6 26.5% 3.75%
Scenario 1 15.7% 3.45%
Scenario 9 14.3% 2.78%
Table 4. Correct detections and false alarms.


















Figure 18. ROC curve.
When crossplotted, the ROC curve seen above is generated. Although the
curve indicates high performance in general, it is where on the curve the subject
is operating that is of concern. Subjects are valuing correct rejections above
correct detections. This causes there to be few false alarms at the cost of high
missed detections. Most of the points should have a near perfect CD rate, at the
expense of higher false alarms. In a real ATC task, false alarms are much less
costly than a missed detection.
Recall was also very poor, in both the general and specific questions. In the
specific questions, most were not answered. When they were answered, there
were more right answers than wrong, most distinctly for the conflict question.
Only 3% of the questions were answered wrong for the conflict question(compared to 15% for the other questions). So although conflicts are not recalled
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Figure 19. Specific recall performance.
General recall was better for certain types of questions. It was still very poor
for questions about direction of flight, speed and altitude. The only questions
answered perfectly above 50% of the time asked about the number of conflict
pairs, the number of targets accepted and in what direction the targets were
moving the fastest.
Interestingly, subjects correctly answered the number of conflict pairs 68% of
the time, but only answered where on the screen those conflicts were 33% of the
time. Air traffic controllers have been shown to have excellent spatial memory
for target position. It may be that controllers obtain this ability during training, or
that this is a necessary talent to be a successful air traffic controller.
Another interesting thing to note is that subjects knew how many targets were
handed off 64% of the time, but only recalled the number of targets accepted at
21%. This is probably because acceptances were a relatively simple task,
requiring only that the subject see the unaccepted target icon and click on it.
Handoffs required the subjects to monitor a target until they approached the edge
of the screen, highlight the target, then select a menu item, making sure that the
target then disappeared. The additional time spent dealing with the target, is what
caused better recall.
Workload was considered somewhat low by the subjects, although their
performance suggests otherwise. The order of the workload rating does seem to
have good correlation to expected workload factors (number of conflicts, number
of coaltitude crossings). Against number of conflicts Q=.72 for time load, .75 for
mental load and .60 for stress load. Against number of coaltitude conflicts, q=.61
for time load, .82 for mental load and .83 for stress load. There was very little
correlation to performance (Q=.23/.22/.15 for time load, mental load and stress
load respectively).
Figure 20. Raw workload averages.
5.3.2.2 Correlations
An attempt was then made to correlate the various statistics. Primary task
performance is indicated by CD/FA/MD/CR data. The subjective workload
scale and secondary task performance indicate workload. The remaining items,
recall and clustering (or transitions), have essentially an unknown effect on
primary task performance and workload.
One might speculate that the reason for poor recall is that subjects do not
fixate on targets sufficiently. Figure 21 indicates otherwise. There appears to be
no correlation (Q =.17) between the number of fixations on a target and the
ability to recall. Subjects fixate as frequently on targets for which they had poor
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Figure 21. Fixations vs. recall.
Number of fixations does appear to have some correlation with conflicting
targets and detections, however. In figure 22, it is seen that targets detected as
conflicts have more fixations than those that are not detected, as expected. The
third column is missed detections (MDs), which are targets that are actual
conflicts but are not detected. These are actually included in the "not detected"
column, which includes correct rejections as well as these MDs. While the
difference is not statistically significant, it appears that MDs may have more
fixations than targets not detected. This would mean that subjects actually fixated
on the conflicting targets they did not detect as conflicts to a greater extent than
those targets that were not conflicting. This would reject the interpretation that
subjects did not detect a conflict because they did not look at one target or
another.
A more interesting statistic when examining conflict pairs is transitions, in
particular how many transitions between certain pairs of targets. The average
number of transitions between targets detected as conflicts and not detected as
conflicts is seen in figure 23. Pairs detected as conflicts had nearly three times as
many transitions between them on average compared to pairs not detected.
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Figure 23. Transitions between pairs.
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The Yufik software extends the transition analysis to clusters, and gives a more
complete picture of the pattern of fixations. In attempting to account for the
elements within the cluster, the clusters were examined for the presence of
Priignanz factors (targets belonging to a canonical or sequenced group), proximity
of targets within the cluster, number of coaltitude pairs within the cluster, and the
prevalence of detected conflict pairs within the cluster. The first two factors
would indicate Gestalt-type groupings, the latter two would indicate goal-oriented
clustering.
For each subject, scenario and cluster the percentage of targets within that
cluster that belong to a sequence or canonical form was calculated, and the
average of this percentage is the "Actual" column in figure 26. In several
scenarios there was more than one sequence or more than one canonical form,
and the targets had to be of the same sequence or form to be counted. The
expected percentage was calculated by taking the percentage of targets for the
scenario that belonged to the canonical or sequenced group, multiplying it by the
size of the cluster. This provided the number of targets within each cluster one
would expect to find based on random chance. The percentage was found by
summing over all clusters and dividing by the total number of targets within the
clusters.
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Figure 24. Average percent of cluster
belonging to Pragnanz category.
As an example of the calculations, the actual canonical 1 percentage is 66.9%.
Only scenarios 4, 7 and 9 had sequenced targets. The clusters were compared to
a list of the targets belonging to the first sequence, and a percentage of those
targets within the clusters was calculated. For scenario 4, sequenced targets
represented 60.3% of the clusters on average. For scenario 7 the percentage was
63.6%, and for scenario 9 the percentage was 76.8%. Averaging these
percentages yields the 66.9% figure.
To obtain the expected percentage of targets, it was determined that 25% of
the targets in scenarios 4 and 9 were in the sequenced group, and 18.8% of the
targets in scenario 7 were sequenced. For each cluster this figure was multiplied
by the number of targets within the cluster. The result is the number of
sequenced targets within the cluster one would randomly expect to find. The
results were summed and divided by the total number of targets within the
clusters to obtain the percentage seen above (22.9%).
It is clear from figure 24 that Pragnanz factors are an extremely significant
factor in the formation of clusters. On average, Prignanz factors are found 2.4
times more often than expected. In the canonical forms this figure is much
higher.
Next the role of proximity was examined. The average separation between all
pairs of targets was calculated and compared with the average separation of pairs
within the clusters. Pairs of targets were used since proximity is (at least) between
pairs of targets. If proximity were a factor in grouping, then the average
separation of pairs within clusters would be lower than the average separation of
all pairs. As can be seen in figure 25, this is the case.









Avg Separation (All Pairs) Avg Separation (Cluster Pairs)
Figure 25. Average separations of pairs.
A common technique discussed by controllers is to partition traffic into
coaltitude groups of aircraft. This is an example of goal-oriented clustering. To
determine if the subjects were grouping the targets in this manner, each cluster
was examined for the presence of coaltitude targets. Each target could be at one
of five altitudes, with some altitudes more prevalent in some scenarios than
others. If this type of clustering were occurring, one would expect to find a
higher percentage of coaltitude targets within each cluster than one would find
based on random chance. Figure 26 shows that the actual percentage of
coaltitude targets within clusters is nearly identical to the expected value of
coaltitude targets. The calculations were performed in the same manner as for
the Pragnanz factors.
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Figure 26. Percent of coaltitude targets in
clusters.
Another possible goal-oriented clustering technique would be grouping by
conflict pairs. Subjects may be grouping together targets that are in conflict.
Since conflicting pairs often belong to another group (proximity, sequenced,
coaltitude), it is somewhat difficult to separate out this factor. In figure 27, the
percentage of correctly-detected conflict pairs that are found within the same
cluster is shown. Also shown are incorrectly-detected conflict pairs (false alarms),
correctly-rejected pairs and missed detections. Figure 27 shows that there are a
higher percentage of detected pairs within clusters than pairs not detected,
particularly for correctly-detected pairs. The line in figure 27 is the expected
number of pairs from any particular category one would expect to randomly find.
This is the percentage of all pairs found within clusters.
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Figure 27. Percent of pairs in clusters.
5.3.3 Discussion
Subject performance indicates workload is high, as the subjects are not making
large numbers of false alarms and are making significant numbers of missed
detections. Since the subjects were not given incentives to detect all possible
conflicts, it is possible that they were simply ignoring the instructions, which
emphasized that not missing a detection was the primary goal. Fourteen targets is
a common number of targets to use in an enroute-type ATC task, although this
particular sector would be much smaller than those commonly used. The density
of the aircraft was higher, and that undoubtedly added to the task difficulty.
Also, subjects noted that they were continuously busy during the task.
The question then becomes why conflicts are missed. A common hypothesis
is that it is somehow due to "situational awareness". The results of the recall
portion of the experiment, which are in agreement with the recent results of
Gronlund, Ohrt, et al. (1998), suggest that this may not be the main reason
Performance on the recall task was generally poor. Specific information was only
recalled about 35% of the time. Of that 35%, speed and altitude information was
recalled accurately 21% of the time, while conflict information was better at 30%.
It may seem that the poor recall and poor performance are somehow linked,
and the situational awareness hypothesis is correct. However, previous practice
trials with better trained subjects, who were familiar with both the software and
ATC techniques, showed better performance and equally poor recall. Also,
controllers were asked what information they could remember should the screen
go blank, and they indicated that they could recall very little information. What
information they could remember was approximate locations of targets,
particularly conflict pairs, approximate locations of conflict points and some
general information. This is also supported by the studies mentioned earlier.
Actual controllers would probably do better than untrained subjects at the
recall task in the experiments. To what extent better or worse recall results in
better or worse performance is the important question to answer. One of the
more revealing results from above is that subjects recalled information about
things that required more handling and more physical action than those that only
required scanning. In recalling number of conflict pairs and handoffs, but not
recalling where the conflict pairs were or the number of acceptances, subjects
seem to be reflecting the fact that conflicts and acceptances were "handled" by
selecting targets and using the menu to manipulate them. This result is supported
by supervisory control concepts that have shown a relationship between physical
action and better recall. It also supports controllers' concerns about replacing
physical paper flight strips with electronic ones.
The lack of correlation between number of fixations and recall seems to
indicate that fixation time is not used to remember information. The average
duration of fixation was around 200 msec. In combination with the very short
durations between fixations, this pattern is too short to transfer information into
long-term memory. The iconic memory is being constantly erased by subsequent
fixations on essentially the same data. This would be like trying to read a list of
phone numbers quickly with recall. The pattern of saccades and fixations is not
conducive to recall. This suggests that the scan pattern is doing something else.
The question as to whether this "something else" is perceptual grouping, both
formation and maintenance, is a difficult hypothesis to test directly. Yet
perceptual grouping is difficult to avoid, and Yantis' research shows that
grouping occurs in target-tracking tasks. If the form of the grouping that we can
see in this task agrees with expected groupings, then that would be strong
evidence that such groupings occur.
The data clearly indicates that while conflict detection was somewhat
dependent on number of fixations, there was a stronger relationship between
number of transitions between a pair of targets and detection of a conflict
between those two targets. The eye must move between the targets in the
conflict pair in order to detect the conflict.
This may not seem like a startling conclusion. It does, however, grant more
importance to any factors that influence the pattern of fixations. Moreover,
targets are grouped perceptually, and this grouping affects the sequence of
fixations. The factors that influence the formation of clusters, then, affects the
ability to see conflicting target pairs.
It is then left to identify factors that influence grouping. Yantis found that in
addition to Gestalt factors, "goal-oriented" factors played a role in perceptual
grouping. "Goal-oriented" refers to any feature for which knowledge of the task
objectives is required to connote importance. For this task, conflict detection is
the primary objective. Only target pairs (or groups) that are coaltitude can
conflict, and controllers often use this fact when scanning the scope. So
coaltitude pairs or groups, and pairs or groups detected as conflicts should appear
frequently if goal-oriented clustering is occurring.
This was (mostly) not the case. Gestalt factors, such as common fate
(sequenced targets), Prignanz (canonical targets) and proximity were found in
great abundance within clusters compared to expected values. Other overlapping
Gestalt factors which could not be measured with this data, such as crossing
paths (regardless of altitude), were subjectively found to be present frequently as
well. Coaltitude pairs were found as often than expected.
Detected conflicts were found more often, but the extent to which this is due
to the proximity of targets and other factors in not entirely clear. The finding
that 50% of the correctly-detected pairs were found within the same cluster, while
only 30% of the missed detection pairs were found is important, however. This
indicates that the ability to group conflict pairs within a cluster is important to the
ability to detect that conflict. Gestalt factors, having an apparently more
important role in determining clusters than conflicts, can interfere with the ability




The first experiment failed to find evidence for contributions to complexity by
task features such as target speed variation or altitude variation. The number of
targets overwhelmed any impact these elements may have. Performance
followed classic human supervisory control expectations in two ways. First, as
the number of targets increased, subjects ability to organize their search efforts
deteriorated, eventually resulting in an inefficient random search. Secondly, at
lower numbers of targets subjects had higher numbers of false alarms, due to the
longer conflict detection lead times allowed by the lower workload, or perhaps
also due to the subjects "creating work" for themselves.
The second experiment attempted to find evidence of clustering in eye
movements, which have been shown to represent internal models of viewed
scenes. The clustering was dominated by Gestalt factors. Some evidence of the
involvement of clustering based on conflict pairs was seen, although no evidence
of any other goal-oriented clustering was found. Furthermore, the presence of
both targets in a conflict pair was an important factor in whether that conflict pair
would be detected. If conflict pair members are also members of a Gestalt
cluster, it is much more likely that the conflict will be detected. Alternately,
Gestalt factors can interfere in detecting a conflict if the targets are not members
of the same cluster. The extent to which this is also the case for trained
controllers needs to be examined. It is expected that to some extent training can
overcome this tendency. Gestalt factors, however, are an innate clustering
strategy and would be difficult to eliminate altogether.
This result has important implications for future air traffic control
improvements. Air traffic is currently highly structured, and undoubtedly this
structure improves the ability of the controller to detect potential conflicts. An
accepted proposal for future capacity improvements is the adoption of "free
flight", which will eliminate much of this structure. The extent to which
controllers rely on this structure to "see" conflicts is not understood, and the lack
of this structure could compromise safety.
Another conclusion drawn from the second experiment calls into question the
use of recall tests to make complexity or performance conclusions. Recall
performance is generally poor and there does not seem to be a correlation
between fixations and recall. The correlation with recall appears to be the
method of interaction with the target. The method of accomplishing the primary
task of detecting conflicts interferes with the ability of the controller to recall
details of individual targets. If the controller interacts with the target in a more
physical way, by accepting the target, or handing off the target, or in some other
way more significant than providing separation assurance, the target's details are
more susceptible to recall.
Chapter 7
FURTHER WORK
The predominance of Gestalt factors over goal-oriented factors can be
overcome through training, as was the case in Yantis' experiments. For this
reason it is expected that actual controllers would show more goal-oriented
clustering than these untrained subjects did. The extent to which Gestalt factors
continue to interfere with detection for trained controllers would be a logical next
step in this research.
The structure imposed on the task by the regulated nature of air traffic is
jealously guarded by controllers, and can certainly be an aid in detecting conflicts.
To some extent Gestalt factors can be imposed on the task, even in a random
(free-flight) traffic scenario. Structured traffic can yield more consistency
between potentially conflicting pairs and Gestalt groupings, reducing the
likelihood of a missed detection due to failure to transition between conflicting
targets. An experiment that probes the magnitude of Gestalt interference or
assistance would clarify this contradictory effect of natural grouping criteria.
This could be done without significant modification of the software. New
scenarios that specifically target certain grouping criteria would have to be
developed. Most of the tools to import and analyze fixations already exist in the
database, but new queries would have to be written to specifically pinpoint the
factors being examined. Additionally, real controllers would have to be recruited.
Attempts were made to recruit controllers for this set of experiments, but no
responses have been obtained as of this writing.
Should the primacy of Gestalt groupings be confirmed even in the case of
controllers, there is a number of uses to which this information could be put. If
training allows the controller to overcome the Gestalt tendency and see conflicts
not normally clustered, recording eye movements could be a valuable training
tool. It could indicate techniques to effectively produce goal-oriented clustering,
and could indicate when potential controllers require additional training.
The absence of conflict pairs in clusters is a warning sign of a potential missed
detection. Eye tracking systems are probably still too intrusive to be used
regularly by controllers, but the technology is improving. Should the technology
become sufficiently unintrusive, passive alerting systems could be developed to
point out overlooked conflict pairs. The accuracy of prediction would need to be
excellent for this to be useful.
Another use of this information is to simply display in some manner
appropriate groupings of aircraft to help overcome the tendency to group aircraft
in unproductive clusters. This could be done with colors or actual links
incorporated into the display. What to do about climbing and descending aircraft
would have to be addressed. Another difficulty is that if groupings are too
convincing, it will be difficult to detect conflicts outside those clusters.
The techniques used in these experiments may also have applications to expert
systems. If controller decisions can be related to how targets are clustered, and
these decisions can be shown to have some predictability to them, then expert
rules can be elicited without extensive subjective questionnaires.
Appendix 1
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